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By: Thomas Nickles 
 
Strong conceptions of scientific discovery (in the broad sense of creative work at the frontiers of 
research) are linked to strong conceptions of historical change. Contrariwise, impoverished conceptions 
of both scientific discovery and the history of science yield conservative accounts of scientific work. One 
form of historical impoverishment, of which even strong historicists can be guilty, is a truncated 
conception of history that fails to include future history. The difficulty, nay impossibility, of concretely 
visualizing future historical change leads even sophisticated thinkers to commit what I term ”the end-of-
history fallacy,” analogous to the mistake made by deeply historical thinkers such as Hegel, Marx, and 
Fukuyama. Traditional history of science made us realize that the development of the sciences until now 
has been a highly dynamic enterprise. But traditional history ends at the present, and we need means to 
make the unrealized future come more alive for its creative, hence dynamical possibilities. A better 
appreciation for the nature of creative work at the frontiers of research – a better understanding of 
what we might call frontier epistemology – suggests that even the supposedly mature sciences may 
experience a long- term, highly dynamic future. Such a view has implications for the scientific realism 
debate as well as for science policy and the public understanding of science. 
 
Section 1 of the paper is plea to take history of science seriously once again, indeed, even more seriously 
than in the 1960s and ‘70s, when ‘history of science’ usually meant ‘the past of science’ rather than 
considering that past as only the possibly raw beginnings of time series of developments that may last 
for many millennia beyond the present. Although it sounds oxymoronic, I shall include the history of the 
future as well.  Following original work on the history of mechanics by Koyre´, Butterfield famously 
contended that each modern science began with a founding revolution. In The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions Kuhn went further to argue that there have been later revolutions as well, re-foundings in a 
sense, and that in the mature, hard sciences, later revolutions without end are almost inevitable. 
(Others have since pointed out other kinds of transformative spurts than the Kuhnian variety.) Kuhn is 
one of the few analysts to project such a dramatic future dynamic of science. Given the expansion of 
scientific domains, the tightening of linkages, and the nonlinearity of the internal dynamics of science 
(that even a seemingly normal result can eventuate in a transformation), future Kuhnian revolutions 
might even become larger rather than smaller. 
 
 Section 2 distinguishes several different concepts of mature science and points out crucial tensions be- 
tween retrospective and prospective accounts of maturity. By contrast with Kuhn some strong realists 
hold that mature sciences are both highly creative yet not likely to undergo significant transformation, 
or at most a series of ever-smaller ones that converge on the truth. To argue, as some realists do, that 
today’s sophistication can easily handle the research problems of past frontiers, overlooks the fact that 
living sciences constantly generate new frontiers that are at least as difficult as the old ones. At these 
frontiers the big questions usually involve decision-making under extreme uncertainty rather than 
merely under risk. 
 
 Section 3 relaxes the assumption that a significant future dynamic must be revolutionary. Kuhnian 
revolutions and other sorts of rapid spurts are not necessary to imagine that future mature science may 
well transform itself almost beyond recognition. After all, given enough time, gradual evolution can 
achieve transformations as radical as you please. Further, as in the case of biological evolution, it is 
arguable that, over a plausible range of conditions, the future evolution of science is inevitable – and will 
be much faster. The usual historical-cultural time-scale begins to look rather arbitrary (even presentist in 
a sense) when we consider the future as extending out to, say, 40,000 years of creative scientific 
research, as compared with the 400 years since the beginning of the Scientific Revolution. On the strong 
realist view (which also cannot be proven wrong), these first few centuries will, centuries hence, be 
known as The Age of Scientific Discovery, a project essentially completed.Section 4 briefly sums up my 
”deep history” and ”deep discovery” positions in terms of a set of interpretations of Mary Hesse’s 
”principle of no historical privilege” and some reminders about changing human interests, goals, and 
human creativity. 
 
 In Section 5 I claim that many analysts, including philosophers of science, commit an ”end-of-history 
fallacy,” deriving from the difficulty, nay impossibility, of envisioning a distant future of science. The 
fallacy often involves a cluster of questionable assumptions, including a conflation of different senses of 
‘mature science’ and an insufficiently prospective analysis deriving from our limited horizons of 
imagination. Insofar as maturity implies that the main period of discovery is over, it would seem that 
maturity claims announce the end of the History of science (‘History’ meaning the universal sense of 
‘history’). The fallacy is committed by people who assume, without adequate argument, that the future 
will be relatively ”flat,” i.e., not dynamically interesting, not highly nonlinear, that the future expansion 
of mature science will consist mostly of routine specialization and ”translational” work, a sort of normal 
science ”flatline.” Often this assumption is a default assumption that remains implicit, by an author’s 
simply failing to consider seriously the possibility that the future may be interestingly creative and 
dynamic. 
 
 Section 6 briefly rejects basic objections to the above, namely, that I am a global antirealist whose use 
of the end-of-history fallacy marks me as a global skeptic in matters scientific and that my own views on 
heuristic appraisal undermines my position. Heuristic appraisal is evaluation of the future fertility of 
anything, and sometimes can legitimately judge a given specialty area of be essential finished and hence 
sterile of further significant discoveries. Hence the objection. 
 
Section 7 concludes the paper by briefly pointing out some implications for public understanding of 
science and for policy, including the way granting agencies are run. Highly optimistic philosophies of 
science claiming that mature science has nearly reached its ultimate goal (whether strongly realist or 
not) can discourage investment in long-term, potentially transformative projects. End-of-history fallacies 
may contribute to the conservative granting policies that currently plague institutions such as the U.S. 
National Science Foundation. The overall message of the paper is that, despite our limited horizons 
regarding the future, we philosophers must be more prospective in our thinking. 
 
